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Stages of the Recruitment Process and the Referrer’s Performance Effect
Abstract
Although the existing theory predicts that a referral’s chances of being hired increase with the job
performance of the referrer, no empirical evidence is available to support this claim. To address this
discrepancy, we decompose the recruitment process into objective selection, subjective selection, and
self-selection and theorize that the likelihood of passing a particular recruitment stage increases with the
performance of the referrer under objective selection and self-selection, but remains undetermined at a
stage of subjective selection. Our analysis of unique comprehensive data on online recruitment of sales
agents in a virtual call center supports these arguments. The effectiveness of personnel as a recruitment
channel varies with the type of the recruitment stage and performance of the referrer. When the firm
evaluates candidates by an objective criterion, the advantage of a referral increases with the performance
of his or her referrer; those referred by relatively high-performing workers are significantly better than the
applicants who learned about the job from Internet ads. When job candidates self-select into the next
stage of the online application process, the referral of any agent is more likely to continue than a
nonreferral, and this likelihood increases with the performance of the referrer. On a subjective stage, the
outcome is contingent on the intricacies of the recruitment process. In our case, an applicant’s chances
of being hired increase with the performance of his or her referrer because the firm rejects the referrals of
low-performing workers at a higher rate than it does nonreferrals, while it treats equally the referrals of
high-performing workers and nonreferrals. The study’s contributions to the literature on social networks in
labor markets are discussed.
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Abstract

W e explore network recruitment in a new Internet-based organizational setting
characterized by arm' s-length relationships between the employ er and work ers and
h eightened competition among workers. Personal contacts remain a salient recruitment
channel, although their effectiveness v aries with the type of the recruitment stage: selfselection, objective selection, and subj ective selection. We argue that on a self-selection
stage, where a j ob candidate decides herself whether to proceed to the next stage of the
on-line application process, referrals of current agents are more likely to follow through.
On an objective selection stage, where the firm evaluates candidates by an objectiv e
criterion, the advantag e of a referral increases with the performance of her referrer; the
referrals of relatively higher-performing workers do better than the applicants referred by
inferior candidates. Finally, on a subjectiv e stage, where HR personnel m ake a judgment
about a candidate' s qualifications, the outcome is contingent on the intricacies of the
recruitment process. In our case, an applicant' s chances increase with the performance of
h er referrer, but primarily because the firm rej ects the referrals of worse-performing
candidates rather than giv es an advantage to those of better performing ones. The analysis
utilizes unique comprehensiv e data on on-line recruitment of sales agents in a virtual call
center (VCC). The study ' s contributions to the literature on social networks in labor
m arkets are discussed.

INTRODUCTION
Ov er the last decade, scholars of organizations have been w itnessing the rapid proliferation of a
"virtual" organization characterized by the geographic dispersion of its employ ees who rely on
electronic means to perform their functions and communicate with each other (for review, see
Burris 1998, DeSanctis and Monge 1999). Physical separation is often accompanied by lateral
contractual relationships between the employer and employees (Jarillo 1993 ). Proponents of the
virtual organization emphasize its flexibility and responsiveness to rapidly changing market
conditions; critics see a weakening of the organizational identity, worker loyalty, and social
cohesion that are key determinants of performance (Dav idow and Malone 1992). While such
questions are debated, the number of workers who experience the virtual organizational form on
a regular basis rapidly grows. According to Gartner Group' s estimate, the number ofteleworkers,
defined as those who work from home at least 8 hours a week, more than doubled, from about 5
million in 1999 to 12 million in 2005, and they currently comprise 9.2% of the labor force (Jones
2005).
Although these changes have direct implications for recruitment, very little is known
about the ways in which v irtual organizations recruit workers, in particular, about the role of
recruitment through social networks, the most common and well-studied channel in traditional
settings. The receiv ed theory posits that recruitment is an inherently social process in which
personal relationships among employers, job seekers, and intermediaries play a leading role,
providing intensive hard-to-measure information, attracting candidates who would not apply
through formal labor market channels, and securing a smoother adjustment and more effective
training. Job candidates referred by the firm's current workers are more likely to survive the
selection process and perform on the job because they possess more appropriate observable and

unobservable characteristics, hav e a deeper understanding of the j ob' s requirements and the
firm's culture, and receive informal help with training and socialization (for rev iew of the
literature, see Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore 2000; Granovetter 1995; Marsden and Goorman
2001 ). E stimations show that employers' investment in the social capital of their employees in
the form of bonuses for successful referrals deliver nontrivial economic returns (Fernandez,
Castilla, and Moore 2000). Management textbooks support such practices because referrals " are
more satisfied, productive, and likely to remain" with the firm (Baron and Kreps 1999: 342).
These arguments either explicitly of implicitly assume that workers strongly identifY
themselv es with their organization and are loy al to it. If this were not the case, they would
consider referrals exclusiv ely as an opportunity to help their family and friends while treating
any concerns about the abilities and qualifications of job candidates as the employ er' s business.
Therefore, to the degree in which the v irtual organization undermines workers' organizational
identity and establishes an arm's-length employment relationship, recruitment through referrals
becomes problematic. In addition, insecure employment and the need to constantly defend one' s
position against internal and external competitors creates a disincentive for referring and training
strong candidates who can threaten the referrer herself.
Inevitable changes in the technology of the recruitment process compound these
problems further. So far, the well-familiar face-to-face interview remains an integral part of
recruitment in most organizations. However, as the practice of outsourcing whole business
functions such as sales and customer support grows, performing the same functions in
geographically dispersed locations is becoming widely accepted and even economically
necessary. Remote recruitment is a part of this process and the Internet appears to be the most
appropriate medium for it.
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On one hand, the Internet offers a promising arena for matching employers and workers,
reduces for them the costs of seeking each other, and provides effective tools for testing and
assessing job candidates. On the other hand, it heightens the problem of adv erse self-selection,
since less able candidates, who in the past w ould not bother to apply, find it very easy to do
electronically. Autor (2001) predicts that in response to adv erse self-selection, employers'
reliance on personal contacts will become even more pervasiv e. How ever, if in a v irtual
organization referrers are not concerned with their proteges' fit to the job, they will ex acerbate
adverse selection rather than prevent it.
W e argue that under such circumstances, referrals' likelihood of adv ancing successfully
through the recruitment process relative to nonreferrals is contingent on the selection
mechanism. Only referrals of relatively high-performing agents are actually better when an
objective selection criterion is sy stematically applied across all applicants, because of social
homophily betw een the referral and referrer and information and help provided by the latter to
the former. Howev er, on average any referral is more likely to self-select herself into the job than
a nonreferral which points to adv erse self-selection driv en by referrals' stronger motiv ation and
know ledge of the intricacies of the recruitment process. The important issue is whether HR
personnel can control self-selection by identifYing and rejecting poor matches v ia subjective
selection.
Our analysis of unique comprehensive data on on-line recruitment of sales agents in a
virtual call center (VCC) generally supports these arguments. Personal contacts remain a salient
recruitment channel, although their effectiv eness v aries with the type of the recruitment stage:
self-selection, objectiv e selection, and subjective selection. When job candidates self-select into
the next stage of the online application process, referrals of current agents are more likely to
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continue. When the firm evaluates candidates by an objective criterion, the adv antage of a
referral increases w ith the performance of her ref errer; only the referrals of relatively higherperforming workers are significantly better than the applicants who learned about the job from
Internet ads. Finally , on a subjective stage, where HR personnel make a judgment about a
candidate's qualifications, the outcome is contingent on the intricacies of the recruitment
process. In our case, an applicant' s chances increase with the performance of her referrer, but
primarily because the firm rejects the referrals of worse-performing candidates rather than g ives
an adv antage to those of better performing ones.
The paper is organized as follows: first, w e present relev ant theoretical arguments and
formulate two testable propositions. Next, we describe the empirical setting, which is
substantially different from those in which similar studies have been conducted . The third section
is devoted to a detailed description of our data and research m ethodology. After prov iding
empirical findings, we summarize them, h ighlight their limitations, and discuss their implications
for labor markets and our future research agenda.

THEORETICAL APPROACH
A number of recent case studies of organizations carefully document the role of referrals in
recruitment. We learn that by and large referrals enjoy advantage over n onreferrals due to their
propensity to present m ore appropriate resumes, to apply when m ark et conditions are more
favorable, and to rely on the reputation, influence, and support of their sponsors (Fernandez and
Weinberg 1997; Fernandez, Castilla, and More 2000). Not surprising ly, access to potential
referrers and the ability to mobilize them become major factors in hiring and, for example,
explain hiring rate differentials among ethnic groups (Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel 2000).
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By relying on workers' social networks, employ ers economize on hiring costs and share
these savings w ith the very same workers in the form of bonuses for successful referrals
(Fernandez, Castilla, and More 2000). Such formal referral programs proliferate despite the lack
of evidence that referrals are actually better workers. Castilla (2005) provides the first credible
evidence that referrals are more productive than nonreferrals right after the hire, but the
advantage disappears in the long run and, moreov er, turns into a disadvantage if the referrer quits
the firm. Neckerman and Fernandez (2003) point to multiple contingencies that may shape the
impact of referrals on performance, including the firm's organizational structure. It is puzzling,
however, that the same contingencies do not condition the recruitment process as well; referrals'
adv antage consistently appears at all its stages in the studies currently av ailable.
"Virtuality" is a new organizational contingency that sheds light on the variation in the
impact of referrals on both the recruitment process and performance. Being Internet-based,
virtual recruitment requires a more careful delineation of recruitment stages and leaves an
extensive electronic trail. These two factors make possible a classification of recruitment stages
into a set of distinctive categories and enable a comparison of the referral effect across them.
Any recruitment process typically consists of a number of stages, which we classifY into
three types: self-selection, objective selection, and subjective selection. On stages of selfselection, applicants themselv es decide whether to proceed further or not; the decisions to submit
an application and accept an offer are the most common examples. On stages of objective
selection, an employer consistently applies the same metrics to all candidates and automatically
makes a decision to mov e a person to the next stage if a predetermined target is met. Various
tests with a minimum passing score are the primary example. Subjective selection is
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characterized by relatively vague and idiosyncratic considerations, with the offer-making stage
being a good ex ample.
In a "real" organization, objective selection in the form of tests and other metrics is rarely
separated into a distinct stage but lumped together with subjective considerations on the stage of
an interview or job offer. Therefore, the literature typically deals with subjectiv e selection on the
interview and job offer stages as well as various kinds of self-selection. The transition to virtual
organization, in general, and virtual recruitment, in particular, creates both the opportunity and
the need for clear distinctions among the three types of selection. The opportunity derives from
the ability ofHR departments to administer tests and other standard recruitment procedures online. Computers are perfectly capable of measuring the outcomes of such procedures and
employers can delegate to them standardized decisions. If they do, the procedure becomes a
distinctiv e selection stage. The need to distinguish among the three types of selection stages
stems from the impersonal nature of virtual recruitment. Since HR personnel do not monitor and
guide applicants until late in the process, the process itself has to be well structured and easy to
navigate. The clear assignment of decision-making to the applicant, computer, or an HR person
helps achieve this goal.
We argue that the role of referrals v aries by the type of the recruitment stage. At a selfselection stage, an applicant herself makes the decision whether to proceed further. The
employer has few opportunities to encourage desirable candidates or discourage undesirable
ones. The literature argues that this is one reason why an employer benefits from referrals in the
traditional setting: the referrer turns into a gatekeeper because she cares about her reputation with
the employer, knows the candidate' s shortcomings, and therefore is in a good position to
dissuade her from applying, if necessary. The virtual setting undermines this rationale, since an
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arm's-length relationship between the employ er and referrer greatly diminishes the latter' s
reputational concerns. At the same time, by refusing to promote a relativ e or friend who is less
qualified, the worker loses reputation w ith her personal network, within which help with getting
a job is part of routine reciprocal exchanges enforced by social norms such as "a friend in need is
a friend, indeed." Thus, a network member's needs driv e the referrer' s actions whether the
member is qualified to do the job or not. If a network member decides to apply, the referrer will
support him and help him ov ercome the hurdles of any self-selection stage:

PROPOSITION 1. A referral is more likely than a nonreferral to complete a self-selection stage
of the recruitment process.

The literature offers a few arguments that explain why referrals should be better than
nonreferrals by objective measures. Let us start w ith the oft-cited social homophily argument:
because people tend to socialize with others similar to them and referrers have surviv ed a prior
screening process, their referrals are better qualified than nonreferred applicants (Fernandez,
Castilla, and Moore 2000 ; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001 ; Montgomery 1991 , M ouw
2003; My ers and Shultz 1951, Rees and Shultz 1970; U llman 1966). The argument is
traditionally formulated in terms of observable socio-demographic characteristics such as gender,
age, education, social class, religion, as well as behav iors and values (for rev iew, see McPherson,
Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001 ). Empirical evidence does show that referrals and their referrers
exhibit above-chance levels of homophily on individual characteristics relev ant to recruitment
(Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore 2000) but it does not show that referrers' characteristics can
predict referrals' performance. The latter is not surprising: since socio-demographic
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characteristics usually explain little about the labor market outcomes of their holder, it is hard to
expect them to be informative about their holder' s referral.
In addition, the homophily argument in its current form implicitly assumes that
employers do not make mistakes in hiring or, if they do, they never learn from them. As a result,
if a wrong person has been hired, his future referrals, who are similar to him, will be hired as
well. Howev er, underperforming workers do exist and, according to the very same homophily
principle, their referrers cannot be that good. To address these inconsistencies, we suggest a

weak homophily argument which only asserts that the advantage of a referral over a nonreferral
increases with the fit between the referrer and the job, assuming it is the same job the referral
applies to. 1 The argument does not imply that referrals are always better than nonreferrals. In
fact, it allows for the possibility that under some circumstances even referrals of the v ery best
performers may be indistinguishable from nonreferrals. However, it does suggest monotonicity
in a referral's advantage: ifreferrer A ' s protege is better than a nonreferral, the same should be
the case for an average referrer better than A.
The second widely accepted argument in favor of referrals is often called a better match
argument. It builds on the ability of referrers to equip both employers and job candidates with
detailed, sensitive, and non-standard information about each other and th ereby improve the
ov erall quality of matches (Rees 1966, Granovetter 1974). Useful bits of information may come
not only from what referrers say but also from what they do. N eckerman and Fernandez (2003 :
304-305) describe a referral program that allows referrers to choose at the time of making the

1

In fact, one difficulty with an accurate test of the homophily argument is that referrers more
often than not hold jobs different from the ones they refer to. F ernandez and Castilla (200 1) find
that workers with prior experience on a job are more likely to refer candidates to that job.
However, they do not have access to performance records from prev ious jobs which may it
difficult to evaluate the hom ophily argument.
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referral whether to claim a referral bonus or not. Two-thirds of the referrers did and their
referrals had a significantly lower turnov er rate w ithin the 18 months period after the hire, while
the referrals of those who did not claim the bonus had the same turnover rate as nonreferrals.
Thus, referrers hav e a pretty good idea about the quality of their proteges.
In a v irtual setting, the arm's-length relationship between an employ er and workers may
impede information transfers from the latter to the former. H owever, firms and their job
candidates can still benefit from the candidates' improv ed knowledge of the j ob opportunity due
to their contacts with the referrers. As in the case of homophily , better referrers should prov ide
better information to their proteg es.
Finally, the conventional theory posits that employers benefit from referrals in the long
run due to socialization. Hav ing a link to the firm from the beginning helps the newcomer access
resources, receive inform al training, and form ties to other workers (Fernandez, Castilla, and
Moore 2000). A hidden assumption here is that the spirit of collaboration prevails in
org anizations. We know, on the other hand, that organization members compete against each
other as well (pfeifer and Sutton 2000) and sales are one of the most competitive lines of
business. Therefore, getting a new strong competitor is not necessarily in a referrer's best
interests; however, this becomes less of a concern, the stronger the referrer' s performance. Even
if a relatively strong referrer sponsors a weaker candidate, that candidate may still be marginally
better than nonreferrals. Employ ers should worry, however, if the referrer is a weak performer.
In this case, the competition argument implies that she w ill sponsor a weaker and, more often,
unqualified candidate. To summarize our discussion, a referral's objective superiority over a
non-referral should be a monotonica lly increasing function of the referrer's performance:

9

PROPOSITION 2. On an objective selection stage of the recruitment process, a referral's
advantage ov er a nonreferral increases with the performance of the referrer.

While the outcomes of self-selection and objective selection are susceptible to predictions
regarding the effect of the referrer's performance, the outcome of subjectiv e selection is difficult
to determine because it is often guided by additional considerations unrelated to the indiv idual
performance directly. It may be influenced by the very fact that a candidate is referred, if the
decision maker takes that fact as a signal of the advantages we discussed earlier, even if the
advantages themselves are not there. For example, Fernandez and Weinberg (1997) find strong
empirical evidence of the employer' s preference for referrals v is-a-v is other candidates after the
quality of resumes, including relevant socio-technical characteristics, are taken into account. The
authors speculate that by doing so the employ er rewards the loyalty of its w orkers and giv es
them a sense of empowerment.
At the same time, there are circumstances under which an employer is disinclined to hire
referrals. If w orkers' influence is too strong, the employer may want to prevent their further
empowerment and therefore will try to avoid hiring through referrals (M anw aring 1984). It may
be the case that manag ement is unhappy w ith the current labor force for one reason or another
and w ants a change. For a virtual organization, another possible consideration is the geographic
distribution of its labor force. For ex ample, it is beneficial to have customer service agents
dispersed across various time zones to ensure uninterrupted service around the clock. This is
particularly critical when agents work as independent contractors, since they choose their
working hours themselves . Referrers bring candidates from their own localities and thereby limit
geographic diversification.
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Thus, it is impossible to predict in general terms the effect of referrals on subjective
stages of the selection process; the knowledge of the intricacies of a specific setting is a must.
We describe our setting in the next section.

El\IIPIRICAL SETTING
The Virtual Call Center (VCC)
We analyze the recruitment of sales agents in a Virtual Call Center (VCC). The Center handles
for its clients, w hich are v endors of various products, inquiries and purchases that are generated
from infomercials broadcast on TV networks. Its entire sales force consists of independent
contractors who work from home and process orders ov er the Internet. They are free to
determine their work schedules and set their own hours. The pay is assessed at a fixed rate per
m inute of time on the phone with callers and typically v aries between $8-1 5 for an hour of work,
which includes both time spent on the phone with callers and idle time spent waiting for calls.
The average utilization rate, the percentage of the work time spent on the phone with callers, is
about 50% in the period we study.
Computer-assisted training of new recruits takes place on-line without any coaching by
the firm's personnel. In its instructions to potential job applicants, the firm explicitly states that it
does not prov ide compulsory training beyond the recruitment process and seeks applicants who
are already capable of providing a professional level of services.
To motiv ate performance, the firm makes sales agents compete against each other. The

vee continuously monitors performance by individual product and uses this data to assign
agents their positions in the queue for rece iving calls. Better performers hav e priority, regardless
of the number of calls they have already processed. R emuneration is determined entirely by the
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time an agent spends on the phone with callers and thereby is closely linked to her priority in the

queue.
The w orkers' status as indep endent contractors, their w ork-at-home arrangement, a
highly comp etitive env ironment and transparent performance measures closely linked to rew ards
all point to an arm' s-length employ ment relationship. The vee purposefully shapes it that w ay
by emphasizing that it helps its agents develop and sustain their own home-based businesses.
\Vhenever the conv entional descriptions of the organizational structure do not reflect the arm's
length relationship, they are promptly replaced. For examp le, initially the v e e assigned to each
agent an agent supervisor who w as supposed to monitor her performance, provide help, and
resolv e conflicts. W hen it was noticed that the term " ag ent supervisor" is incompatible w ith a
market-like relationship, it was replaced by "agent facilitator."

The Recruitment Process at the v ee

The v e e does not hav e a pre-set number of v acancies but strives to ensure that the numb er of
agents and their work schedules correspond to the demand for their services. To send a clear
signal that it does not hire a permanent labor f orce and instead contracts free ag ents to conduct
its business, the v e e refers to its recruitment process as "certification." The certif ication process
consists of multiple stages. To prepare for them, an applicant registers on the v e e 's website and
provides her background information: education, Spanish speaking skills, y ears of experience in
sa les and call centers, and so forth.

12

On Stage One, the testing stage, an applicant decides whether to take reading and logic
2

tests and if she fails even one of them, her application is rejected and she may not proceed
further. The test is administered entirely on the Web with the computer calculating the score and
making the decision. Thus, according to our classification, Stage One consists of two analytically
separate sub-stages of self-selection and objectiv e selection: an applicant self-selects into taking
the tests while the computer determines whether she passes them according to an objective
criterion.
Next, an applicant decides w hether or not to take a voice test. Although HR personnel do
not ev aluate results immediately , but rather later, together with the whole application package,
the j ob candidate cannot proceed further without taking this test and therefore we put taking the
v oice test into a separate Stage Two. According to our classification, it fits into the self-selection
category.
W ith the v oice test taken, a job candidate' s application package is complete and ready for
screening, and subsequent approval or denial. During the screening process the HR personnel
rev iew the materials submitted, listen to the v oice test recording, and conduct a phone interview,
although the latter does not always take place. This is where the recruitment process has a
bottleneck. HR personnel are physically incapable of processing all the applications in a timely
manner and hav e to establish some priority. The absence of formal procedures gives leeway to
individual HR officers . This makes the process vulnerable to external influences and some of the

2

In reality, Stage One is intertwined with the registration process, since applicants are allowed to
provide the background information and take tests in any order they wish. However, a negligibly
small number of applicants move to tests before submitting background information.
13

firm' s current agents seize the opportunity . Their typical intervention takes the form of an
electronic recommendation such as the following: 3
"I am writing reg arding My niece, Kim Johnson. She talked to Mary on thursday and was
told that she would process her application; someone named (lola or lena) would be calling
her on friday or monday . She is still waiting to here from her. Kim's im is
kim@Yahoo.com. Thanks for passing the message along ."

As the next two examples suggest, some agents make an explicit pitch on behalf of their
protege while others take a seemingly neutral stand:

"Hi Dana.. ..
Good new s! I got a new computer this w eekend, and as y ou can see by my w eekend, things
are working out great! You should be seeing a lot more of me! :-)
Secondly, I w anted to let y ou know that I have referred 2 people to VCC. One is a friend I
hav e known since 5th grade and the other is my mother. Nina Eider applied a little over a
week ago and hasn't heard anything y et, and my mother, Sylvia Morgan, just applied today.
I know there isn't a referral program or anything, but was hoping that making you aware of
it might help in some w ay .. .. especially for my mother. Things are pretty rough for my
parents financially and I think this would be a great answer for them.
They are both very reliable and ethical people and I think they would be good additions to
the VCC team. I know they are both anxious to begin their home based businesses.
Thanks so much for y our time, and have a wonderful day !
Anna Morgan"
" So it turns out that Kathy's daughter is apply ing to become a VCC agent. She passed all
the tests but hasn' t heard anything for 3 weeks . I told her to ask you guys to push her
through, but she' s adamant that Ellen (her daughter) is to receiv e NO special treatment.
Whatever. Her name is Ellen Norton. She used to work in the development group for
VCC, but her app still may not catch your attention. Can you guys pass her through? D on't
tell Kathy ;-)"

As one can see from these recommendations, getting attention from HR personnel poses a
challenge for referrers. As the last message suggests, the VCC' s HR personnel treat such
attempts favorably, in particular, since the agreement to screen does not commit them to a
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To preserve the anonymity of the firm and agents, we substitute fictional names for the real
ones.
14

positive recruitment decision. In our interviews with HR personnel, all of them claimed that the
firm does not treat referrals differently and, in fact, does not pay attention to recruitment sources
when deciding whether to approve a particular application. Such claims are consistent with the
arm's-length employment relationships the firm establishes with its sales agents. Recently the
firm realized that hiring through referrals becomes an impediment for the geographic
div ersification of its labor force. A substantial portion of the sales agents reside in Florida and
Texas and therefore are at high risk of disruption during hurricane season. They also tend to go
to church at the same time on Sunday mornings, which happens to be a popular shopping time.
If an application is approved, the HR department sends to the applicant some paperwork
and directs her to assemble computer equipment and to sign up for telecommunication services
necessary to perform the functions of a sales agent. Since the agent fully controls the process at
this stage, Stage Four, which we call Agent Creation, it can be characterized as a self-selection
stage.
On Stage Five, the training stage, the candidate goes through on-line training which
consists of taking quizzes and making two sales of real products to real callers. When the sales
are completed, the candidate is certified and becomes a full-fledged sales agent for the VCC. The
HR department has no means to intervene in this process or influence its outcome, and therefore
the stage fits into the objective selection category 4
To summarize, the five stages of the recruitment process cover all the three types of
selection stages introduced in the previous section. Passing the Reading and Logic Tests and
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In principle, a referrer m ay complete the training on her behalf, although in practice it is highly
unlikely. At the end of the day, the protege is the one who needs to make a living, since there is
no reason why the referrer may want to work under another name at the same vee. Moreov er,
the vee punishes severely for misrepresentation, i.e., logging in its system under another
agent' s ID.
15

Training constitute obj ective selection; taking the Reading and Logic Tests, taking the Voice
Test, and Agent Creation represent self-selection; finally , the Approv al stage is an instance of
subjective selection.
The VCC promotes sales jobs entirely ov er the Internet in a passive mode (cf., Marsden
and Gorman 2001, Yakubovich 2006). It does not advertise them, but instead relies on word-ofmouth and a v ariety ofwebsites known to be visited by appropriate audiences, such as at-home
workers, stay -at-home mothers and people with disabilities. One of the items in the application
questionnaire asks the applicant to state how she found out about the job and, if she w as referred
internally , the name of the sales agent who referred her. We use this piece of information to
identify the recruitment channel.

DATA AND METHOD
Data
We analy ze the VCC's complete database of applications for the position of sales agent
submitted b etween September 2004 and February 2005. The database contains 14,843 records of
everyone who started the 5-stage certification process. Applicants from the states of N ew York,
California, Oregon, W ashington, Alaska, and Hawaii are automatically deemed unqualified
because of state laws that limit a firm's ability to utilize independent contractors. After removing
these applicants, the sample size becomes 13,387. 190 applicants were returning agents. Of the
remaining applicants, 22 indiv iduals previously conv icted for financial crimes are also rejected
by the VCC and therefore excluded from the analysis . 227 applicants did not officially submit
their applications, because they did not click the submit button, and therefore have never been
processed. Further, 328 records cannot be analyzed because they hav e missing values for som e
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variables of interest (gender, ethnicity, income). The company considers only those w ho provide
all the required background information. 3,612 applicants f ailed to do so which leaves us with
9,008 cases available for analysis.

The Dependent Variables
Our research questions require a dependent variable for each stage of the recruitment process.
The Reading and Logic Tests stage includes two selection steps and therefore are represented by
two dependent v ariables. The dependent variable for each selection step is a dummy coded 0/1 :
(1 .1) reading and logic tests taken, (1. 2) reading and logic tests passed; (2) v oice test taken; (3)
application approved; (4) agent created; (5) training completed .
Since a candidate is rejected after the first failure, "taking both tests" means that a
candidate either took both tests or took one test, failed, and therefore was not allowed to take the
second test. In other words, the v ariable 'reading and logic tests taken' is equal to zero only
when an applicant v oluntary decided to not take a test. Accordingly, the variable ' reading and
logic tests passed' is defined for the applicants who took both tests in the sense just explained. In
a similar fashion, the v ariable 'voice test taken' is defined for those who passed the reading and
logic tests, the v ariable 'agent approved' f or those w ho passed all the tests, the variable ' agent
created' for those who were approv ed, and finally, the v ariable 'training completed' for those
who passed the preceding Agent Creation Stage. Thus, we have six dependent v ariables defined
on a set of nested samples. W e discuss how to model them in the Statistical Models section
below .
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The Independent Variables: Hiring Channel and the Referrer's Performance
A closed-end question on the vee application form asks a candidate how she found out about
the job and offers the choice among six mutually exclusiv e answers : another agent, friend, job
ad, bulletin board, chat room , and other. Since the firm does n ot advertise the j ob in traditional
mass media, we combine "job ad," "bulletin board," and "chat room" into one category "the
Internet" and treat it as a reference group.
The distinction between the two types of personal contacts, "agent" and "friend," is
important. The former is a proper referrer who possesses information about the employer and can
influence the recruitment process. Our conversations with the vee' s HR personnel sugg est that
the category "friend" is heterogeneous. Mainly , it includes people unaffiliated with the v ee who
learned about the job from others or over the Internet and represent essentially another market
channel, the only difference being that they target a specific person rather than broadcast
information widely. In a small number of cases, the friend can be a staff member of the Vee
whose influence on recruitment is stronger than that of sales agents. We consider it as a distinct
channel for the purpose of this analysis and assign to it a separate dummy v ariable.
An applicant who indicates that she was referred to the job by an agent is supposed to put
the name of the agent on the application form. We coded each agent by the individual agent ID
assigned by the

vee, which allowed us to link th ese data to performance variables. W e measure

each referring agent's performance by the utilization rate. Because the agent is paid a fixed rate
per minute on the phone, the utilization rate is proportional to the hourly wage, which is not
perfect but certainly an adequate indicator of the agent's performance in our setting. Essentially,
it measures the agent's fit to the job. The utilization rate varies with the overall demand for the
vee's services, and therefore we construct the performance v ariable as relative performance by

18

div iding the utilization rate of the focal agent for a two-week pay period by the mean utilization
rate over the same period and averaging it over all the pay periods worked by the agent during
the observation window of our study . 3 88 agents became referrers before they started working
themselv es; we combine them in one group labeled "unrated agents. "

Control Variables5

To control for the factors that aff ect a job candidate' s progression through the recruitment stages,
we code the background information prov ided on the application. Three dummies - "university"
and "advanced degree" with " secondary school" as a reference category- capture candidates'
education lev el. Relevant skills are measured by the dummies " call center experience" and
"telemarketing experiences," and by the continuous variable " sales experience" coded in six twoy ear increments: 1-2 years, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-1 0, more than 10 y ears. The overall job experience is
measured by the number of jobs the applicant has had over her career.
The vee is particularly interested in recruiting agents with excellent Spanish skills. The
dummy variable "excellent Spanish" reflects that concern; it is equal to 1 if the applicant reports
excellent spoken and written Spanish.
In accordance w ith anti-discrimination laws, the vee is not allowed to solicit
information on the gender and race of their job applicants. Since the vee's sales agents are
predominantly women, gender may be an issue for both recruitment and performance (Reskin
and McBrier 2000, Fernandez and Sosa 2003). To control for it, we code a dummy "female"
from a respondent's first name.

5

A concise dictionary of all the v ariables used in the analysis is in Appendix.
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To control for race, w e use as prox ies the percentages of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in
the zip code area where the agent resides. We also take into account the area's overall economic
prosperity and job opportunities by measuring its per capita income. The zip code-lev el v ariables
come from the 2000 US Census data.
Since the V CC is concerned about the geographic diversificat ion of its agent pool, an
applicant's chances of passing the Approval stage may be affected by the number of available
agents and other applicants from the same state in the same time period. To control for this
situation we construct a variable which counts the number of activ e agents from the same state at
the time when the application is screened for approv al.

Statistical Models
Our dependent v ariables are observed on progressively smaller subsamples of the original pool
of applicants; for those who fail the previous stag e, the v alu e of the dependent variable for the
following stage is undetermined. This well-known sample selection problem can lead to biased
conclusions about the effects of specific variables. For example, to properly evaluate the
relationsh ip between referrals and the likelihood of successfully passing the training stage, the
VCC would need to allow all the applicants to enter the training stage. Instead, only those who
become agents may go into training. To the degree in which the selection process removes less
capable applicants, whether referred or not, the survivors should be more uniformly qualified and
therefore any advantage of referrals, if it existed, should decline. A t the extreme, an analy sis of
surviv ing referrals will lead us to the false conclusion that they are equally qualified w ith
nonreferrals.
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To address this problem, we estimate a regression model with se lection. Basically , it
consists oftwo models . The first is a selection model of an applicant' s chances to proceed to the
stage under consideration; the second one is the probit model that estimates the applicant's
chances to succeed at that stage. Both models are estimated simultaneously using the fullinformation maximum likelihood method which provides consistent and asymptotically efficient
estimates for all the parameters (StataCorp 2003: 75-84).
The v ariable "performance of a rated agent" is defined only in those cases when the
hiring channel is an ag ent whose performance can be rated, i.e., when the agent has been
working for at least one two-week pay period before referring the applicant. At the same time, in
order to obtain the effect of a referral, w e hav e to estimate our models for all the applicants,
whether they are recruited with the help of a rated agent or not. This can be done if the dummy
variable X1 for a rated agent as a hiring channel and the continuous v ariable Xz for the
performance of a rated agent are included in a model in the following way:
aX 1+ bX1X2 = (a+ bXz)X1,

where a and bare estimated coefficients. W hen X 1 is equal to 0, i.e. , when the applicant is not
referred by a rated agent, X 2 can take any finite value, since the product X 1X 2 is equal to 0
anyway. The right-hand side of the equation abov e shows that this specification fits exactly the
propositions we are testing. N amely, it suggests that the effect of a referral expressed as (a+ bX 2)
varies with the referrer's performance X z.

RESULTS
Table 1 contains the descriptive characteristics of the variables included in the analysis. It is split
into two parts, A and B, for categorical and continuous characteristics, respectively.
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Tables 1 a and 1b about here

As Table 1a shows, 9008 job seekers completed an application form on the VCC' s website and
thereby initiated the recruitment process. More than 80% of them are women, which is consistent
with other evidence that w ork at home attracts primarily females, stay -at-home mothers in
particular. More than two thirds of the applicants hold univ ersity degrees and another 7%
adv anced degrees, wh ich is a high level of education for a sales agent job. The average applicant
comes from an area w ith about $20,000 annual income per capita. The applicants appear well
qualified for the job. M ore than half of them hav e worked for call centers before, slightly less
than half hav e telemarketing experience, and the average tenure in sales is about 3 years.
About 24% of the applicants found out about vacancies from a sales agent currently
working for the firm; another 24. 8% receiv ed the same information from a friend who is not an
agent. Thus, 4 8.8% of the applicants learned about the job through personal contacts, which is
remarkably similar to numerous previous studies (for review, see Granovetter 1995, Marsden and
Gorman 200 1). As job candidates progress through the hiring stages, the proportion of those
referred by other agents slowly but steadily increases. The proportion of those who learn about
the job from friends who are not agents fluctuates around the 25% m ark while the percentage of
those who get job information from the Internet gradually decreases from 35.9% at the Reading
and Logic Tests Stage to 26. 1% at the Training Stage. The category "other" is responsible for
about 14% -15% of candidates, which is significant for a residual category. We do not have
additional information to decompose it further.
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As one could expect, the mean performance of rated agents is close to one, since a
referring agent's performance is, essentially, her utilization rate divided by the average
utilization rate (although the averaging is done within each pay period rather than over the whole
observation period of the study). An interesting point is that the mean performance gradually
increases from 0 .9 o 1.1 as the recruitment process progresses from one step to the next. This
suggests that at least on the descriptive lev el, a referrer' s performance is positiv ely related to her
protege' s cha nces to succeed.
Tab le 2 shows the applicants' chance of succeeding across the stages of the recruitment
process by selected individual characteristics. Men do slightly better on tests, although this does
not help them at the critical Approv al and Training Stag es where women are more successful.
Not surprisingly , higher educated people do better on the reading and logic tests. However, they
look slightly ov erqualified for the job on the Training Stage where candidates with secondary
education are more successful than those w ith higher and advanced degrees.
Table 2 about here
The transition rates by hiring channel shed first light on the main theme of the paper. We
see that through all the steps of the recruitment process but Approval the applicants referred by
other experienced agents do much better than anybody else. W e carry out regression analysis to
find out w hether this advantage is still present when other factors are controlled for and w hether
it varies by the performance of the referrer. It should also help us understand the exceptional
status of the Approval Stage. Table 3 shows the coefficient estimates for the models w ith the
variable for the referrer's performance included; Table 4 shows the coefficients for hiring
channels wh en referring agents are not differentiated by their performance.
Tables 3, 4 about h ere
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Some effects of the control variables shed light on the inner w orkings of the recruitment
process at the VCC. Despite being less likely to pass the Reading and Logic Tests, female
applicants are given a priority by the HR staff on the Approval Stage. The inconsistency between
the objective criterion and subjectiv e opinion more likely indicates that the tests are not
comprehensive measures of all the job requirements rather than an ev idence of the HR
personnel's bias.
A higher lev el of education helps the applicants with the reading and logic tests but
becomes irrelev ant as the recruiting process unfolds, which is not surprising , since it is n ot a
prerequisite for a sales agent. Call center experience makes a difference on all the stages but the
last two. Telemarketing experience does not add much on any of the stages. Sales experience is
highly desirable, and therefore it is not surprising that it plays a significant role on the Approval
stage. The negative effect of the number of the current agents in the applicant's state on
Approval reflects the VCC' s concern about the geographic div ersity of the agent population.
Following the logic of our theoretical arguments, we look at the effects of referrals on
self-selection steps of the recruitment process: Test Taking, Voice Test, and Agent Creation. In
all these cases, the estimated coefficient for the variable Agent in Table 4 is positive and
statistically significant. As Proposition 1 claims, referred applicants are more likely to self-select
into continuing the recruitment process. The findings in Table 3 reveal that on two self-selection
stages, Test Taking and Agent Creation, the likelihood of passing increases with the referrer 's
performance. For example, as shown on Figure 1, the impact of a referring agent whose
performance is twice as high as the average performance is more than double the impact of a
referring agent whose performance is at the lower end (. 835 coefficient v ersus .361). Similar
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patterns appear on Figures 3 and 5 for the Voice Test and Agent Creation Stages, although the
slope of the line is not statistically significant for the former.
To test Proposition 2, we interpret the effects of a referrer' s performance on the two
objective steps: Test Passing and Training. On the Test Passing step, an applicant is required to
score at least 60 points (out of 100) on two different tests which measure her reading and
analytical abilities. As shown in Table 3, the Rho coefficient has a high v alue of .948 and is
statistically significant which implies that the probit model with selection is superior to the
conventional probit model. The estimates show that an applicant referred by a current agent is
not better than an Internet applicant but that an applicant from the other channels fares
significantly worse. One plausible explanation is that it is not necessarily the difficulty of the test
per se which prevents applicants referred by non-agent friends from scoring well, 6 but it may be
their unfamiliarity with Internet based tests. Internet applicants are probably computer savvy, and
for a person referred by an agent, the gap can be closed if the agent explains to the applicant how
the computer-based application works.
For the Training Stage, the probit model with selection does not improve the fit in
comparison with the conv entional probit model (the Rho coefficient is insignificant) and the
estimates of the coefficients slightly vary in magnitude but not in the significance level between
the models. In accordance with Proposition 2, Table 3 shows that the likelihood of passing the
Training Stage increases with the referrer' s performance. Figure 7 illustrates the pattern of the
increase. Low performing referrers do not make any difference. As the referrer' s relative
utilization rate reaches .8, the effect of the referral on the applicant's success in training becomes
6

Our interviews with the VCC's HR personnel and observations of the company's operating
procedures suggest that the tests are not designed to precisely identifY "certifiable" candidates.
They are purposefully designed to be pretty liberal and to reject only apriori weak and
unmotivated applicants.
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statistically different from zero. In substantive terms, the impact of the highest performing
referrers is almost double the impact of medium performing referrers. Thus, Proposition 2 holds
on the Training Stage.
Finally, we look at the subjectiv e A pprov al Stage. As shown in Table 3 (column 4), the
likelihood of an applicant being approv ed increases with the referrer' s performance. Thus, the
subjectiv e process of approval is pretty much aligned with the objective stages with regard to the
treatment of referrals; being referred per se does not make a difference, the performance of the
referrer does matter. In particular, as Figure 4 show s, applicants referred by low performing
agents are more likely to be rejected than Internet applicants; the negativ e effect persists until the
referrer's relativ e utilization rate reaches 0.4.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Our study extends the literature on social netw orks in recruitment to the new doma ins of virtual
organizations and independent contractors. These domains are characterized by an arm' s-length
relationship between the firm and its labor force, competition among workers, the firm's
generally passiv e attitude towards recruitment and ignorance of the channels through which it
takes place, and workers' ambivalence regarding loy alty to the employer and the quality of the
applicants they refer. The fact that even under such circumstances networks remain salient and
referrals are beneficial to the employer nicely illustrates the structural side of networks' role in
the labor market, independent of the interests and motivations of the parties inv olv ed. Referrals
still make a difference because they are driven by a number of social mechanisms bey ond the
firm's and w orkers ' control. In particular, social homophily and information exchange between
referrers and job candidates are at w ork, no matter how actively the firm shapes its relationship
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with the labor force and its pool of applicants. Since a detailed large-scale representative study of
recruitment across many diverse organizations is still infeasible, a case-by-case approach to
enlarging the scope and testing the limits of our theories is the second best option whose promise
the paper demonstrates.
While a number of recent studies that pursue this strategy document advantages of
referrals (e.g., Fernandez et. al. 2000, Petersen et. al. 2000), they cannot tell whether these
advantages result from objective strengths of referrals, their motiv ation and persistence, or
recruiting managers' subjective belief in their superiority. The virtual organization of the
recruitment process allows us to separate these factors. We find robust evidence that referrals are
more persistent through the stages when the applicants must decide themselves whether to
continue. At the same time, we also find support for the assertion that not all referrals are
objectively better candidates: only the referrers of relatively high-performing agents are more
likely to complete the training which is as close to actual performance as one can reach within
the recruitment process. This finding is another contribution of the paper made possible by the
extensive trail of accurate electronic data that a v irtual organization offers. The fact that referrals
do not do significantly better on the Reading and Logic Tests does not invalidate our
conclusions, as the tests are designed to screen out the weakest candidates rather than to find the
strongest ones.
Finally, we shed new light on the subjective judgments ofHR personnel by showing that
referrals attract their attention and offering some anecdotal evidence on referrers' exercise of
influence at the v e e. Although attracting attention is not identical to being approved, our
analysis suggests that screening is the key stage in the v e e 's recruitment process and, most
likely, in any Internet-based recruitment. If the barriers to submitting an application are low, HR
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personnel risk being overwhelmed by applicants. As a result, waiting for screening may take
months, as is the case at the

vee, and therefore referrers'

ability to reduce the waiting period

presents a critical advantage. From the HR personnel's perspectiv e, paying attention to referrals
is generally warranted, if only because they do better on the Training Stage, which is as close to
performance as we can get with the data at hand. Howev er, it also makes sense to expedite the
screening of highly qualified individuals who are not referred, since our analysis suggests that
they are likely to lose interest in the position if not contacted quickly enough.
M ore generally, our analysis shows that to control pervasiv e self-selection, practitioners
of online recruitment should proceed expeditiously or risk losing the most attractiv e applicants.
In the long run, the continuous disappointment of qualified candidates as well as excessiv e
numbers of unqualified ones may become the primary factor that will turn on-line recruitment
into another formal channel with low reputation.

7

The Bureau of Labor Statistics' 2001 Current Population Survey finds that about 12.5
m illion workers, or only 9 .4% of the labor force, practice alternative forms of employ ment as
independent contractors, on-call workers, temporary help agency workers, and contract company
workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2001). This raises the concern about too narrow a scope of
our results. Although any definite claims are impossible without additional research, it would be
a mistake to rule out generalizations completely. As restructuring and downsizing become a way
of life for American firms, security, in-kind benefits, and career trajectories traditionally offered
by long-term employment relationships are being left in the past (Barker and Christensen 1998,
Capelli 1999). As a result, ev en traditional forms of employment become driven by competitive
7

The results of our research which are not reported here show that the longer it takes the VCC to
screen an applicant, the more likely it is that the applicant will refuse to proceed to the Agent
Creation Stage because she is not interested in the job anymore. This is particularly true for
better qualified candidates.
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forces which erode the reputational concerns and loy alty typically associated w ith such forms.
The experiences of independent contractors may teach us something about traditional
employment relationships as well.
By the same token, independent contractors may not exactly be the free agents the
literature portray s them to be. For example, the VCC maintains a chat room where sales agents
go to not only to resolv e technical problems but to engage in social interactions with the
colleagues who work with them on the same shift. Relationships forged in such interactions may
strengthen agents' group identity and their attachment to the w orkplace. Only future research can
tell if such processes take place and how they shape the firm's recruitment.
In addition to v irtual organization and independent contractors, another important
contextual detail of the paper's setting is the completely informal role of the recruitment through
networks at the VCC. So far, the best empirical studies on the topic rely on data accumulated as a
byproduct of employers' formal referral policies. Fully aware of the utility of social networks in
recruitment, employers treat them as a key component of such policies. Social networks become
a tool for screening for talent and reaching out to potential job candidates who otherwise would
not apply (Breaugh and M ann 19 84; Fernandez and Weinberg 1997; Fernandez, Castilla, and
Moore 2000; Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel2000). Paradoxically, researchers manage to shed
new light on informal structures, only to the degree in which those are formalized. Our study
benefits from the fact that any activ ity on the Internet leaves a record, whether or not the actors
desire one. The employ er we study neither rewards its sales agents for referrals nor advertises its
vacancies. We empirically show that in this more informal setting, referrals maintain an
important labor market role, which brings the literature on referrals closer to its origins in the
literature on organizations' embeddedness in informal social netw orks.
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Table l a: Frequency Distribution for Selected Categorical Characteristics of Job Candidates

Reading and Logic Tests
Passed
Taken
N
%
N
%

Training

%

N

%

N

%

N

21.8
4.5
25.3
33.4
15.0

1279
258
1371
1897
827

22.7
4.6
24.3
33.7
14.7

1167
226
11 88
1558
709

24.1
4.6
24.5
32.1
14.6

704
144
71 4
957
417

23.9
4.9
24.3
32.6
14.2

526
99
462
466
235

29.4
5.5
25.8
26.0
13.1

5999

82.9

4643

82.4

3991

82.3

2461

83.8

1499

83.8

23.8
69.0
7.2

1696
5013
527

23.4
69.3
7.3

1184
4011
437

21.0
71.2
7.8

1015
3445
388

21.0
71.1
8.0

586
2112
238

20.0
71.9
8.1

330
1304
154

18.5
72.9
8.6

53.4
44. 1
4.6

3990
3292
328

55.1
45.5
4.5

3181
2582
236

56.5
45.8
4.2

2812
2269
208

58.0
46.8
4.3

1869
1466
172

63.6
49.9
5.8

1162
895
11 6

64.9
50.0
6.5

1777
388
2236
3234
1373

19.7
4.3
24.8
35.9
15.3

1579
327
1834
2414
1082

Female

7489

83.1

Education
Secondary
Higher
Advanced

2141
6221
646
4817
3972
412
9008

Agent Creation

N

Hiring Channel
Rated Agent
Unrated Agent
Friend
Internet
Other

Call Center Experience
Telemarketing Experience
Excellent S12anish
Total

Ste12s of the Recruitment Process
Voice Test
Approval

7236

5632

4848

2936

1788

%

Table lb: Means and Standard Deviations for Selected Continuous Characteristics of Job Candidates

Performance of Rated Agent
Sales Experience
Previous Job Experience
Asian(%)
B lack(%)
Hispanic (%)
Whites(%)
Income (in $1000)
Number of Agents from
Same State
Total

Reading and Logic Tests
Taken
Passed
.9
.9
.4
.4
3. 1
3. 1
3.3
3.3
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.8
1.8
2.8
2.8
15.5
15.8
22. 1
22.2
10.5
10.7
17.2
17.3
69.9
69.3
27.2
27.4
20.6
20.5
6.8
6.8
195.5
201.1
203.2
204.6
9008
7236

SteEs of the Recruitment Process
Voice Test
Approval
1.0
.4
3. 1
3.3
1.1
1.1
1.7
2.7
15.5
21.9
10.6
17.2
69.8
27.3
20.7
6.9
199.9
205.3
5632

1.0
.4
3.2
3.3
1.1
1.0
1.7
2.7
15.9
22.3
10.9
17.6
69.0
27.6
20.7
6.9
204.3
208.3
4848

Agent Creation
1.0
.4
3.5
3.3
1.1
1.0
1. 7
2.7
15.4
2 1.8
11.4
18.3
68.9
27.7
20.7
6.9
181.4
186. 7
2936

Training
1.1
.4
3.6
3.4
1.1
1.0
1.7
2.8
15.7
2 1.9
11 .5
18.3
68.4
27.9
20.7
6.9
197.9
194.7
1788

Table 2. The Rates of Transition across Steps of the Recruitment Process by Selected Charactedstics of the Applicants

Reading and Logic Tests
Taken
Passed
Pass%
Pass%
Enter
Enter
N
N

SteEs of the Recruitment Process
Voice Test
Approval

Agent Creation

Training

Enter
N

Pass%

Enter
N

Pass%

Enter
N

Pass%

Enter
N

Pass%

Hiri112 Channel:
Rated Agent
Umated Agent
Friend
Internet
Other

1777
388
2236
3234
1373

88.8
84.2
82.0
74.6
78.8

1579
327
1834
2414
1082

81 .0
78.8
74.7
78.5
76.4

1279
258
1371
1897
827

91.2
87.5
86.6
82.1
85.7

1167
226
1188
1558
709

60.3
63.7
60.1
61.4
58.8

704
144
714
957
417

74.7
68.7
64.7
48.7
56.3

526
99
462
466
235

84.4
74.7
75.6
73.6
74.0

Gender: Female
Male

7489
151 9

80.1
81.4

5999
1237

77.3
79.9

4643
989

85.9
866

3991
857

61.6
55.4

2461
475

60.9
608

1499
289

77.4
74.4

Education:
Secondary
Higher
Advanced

2141
6221
646

79.2
80.5
81.5

1696
5013
527

69.8
80.0
82.9

1184
4011
437

85.7
85.8
88.7

1015
3445
388

57.7
61.3
61.3

586
2112
238

56.3
61.7
64.7

330
1304
154

79.4
76.2
78.0

Call Center Experience: Yes
No

4817
4191

82.8
77.4

3990
3246

79.7
75.5

3181
2451

88.4
83.0

2812
2036

66.5
52.4

1869
1067

62.2
58.7

11 62
626

75.8
78 .9

Telemarketing Experience: Yes
No

3972
5036

82.8
78.3

3292
3944

78.4
77.3

2582
3050

87.8
84.5

2269
2579

63.7
57.0

1466
1470

61.1
60.7

895
893

77.3
76.5

Excellent Spanish: Yes
No

412
8596
9008

79.6
80.3
80.3

328
6908
7236

71.9
78.1
77.8

236
5396
5632

88.1
85.9
86.0

208
4640
4848

82.7
59.6
60.6

172
2764
2936

67 .4
60.5
60.9

116
1672
1788

Total

73 .3
77.2
76.9

Table 3. The Probability of a Job Candidate Completing a Step of the Rec1·uitment P rocess:
Bivariate Probit Model with the A~ent- Referrer's Performance as a Predictor, Controllin~ for Selection at the Previous Stepst
Steps o f the Recmitment Process

Tests Taking
Self-Selection

Type of Selection
Hiring Channel (Internet)
Rated Agent
Performance of Rated Agent
Umated Agent
Friend
Other

.308
.263
.333
.247
.124

Female

-.01 1 (.041 )

Education (Secondill:J::)
Higher
Advanced

.024 (.036)
.063 (.066)

Call Center Experience
Sales Experience
Excellent Spanish
Previous Job Experience
Telemarketing Experience
Agents from Same State (1,OOOs)
Income
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Constant

(.094)***
(.090)**
(.080)***
(.039)***
(.045)**

.216 (.031 )***
.007 (.005)
.062 (.015)***

Tests Passing
Objective
.003
-.024
-.061
-.171
-.111

(.091)
(.083)
(.079)
(.040)** *
(.047)*

-.097 (.042)*

.27 4 (.035)***
.37 4 (.068)** *
.103
-.005
-.167
.057
-.028

(.034)**
(.005)
(.069)*
(.016)** *
(.033)

Voice Test
Self-Selection
.190
.089
.126
.131
.109

(.117)
(.1 09)
(.096)
(.049)**
(.057)

.023 (.050)

-.086 (.046)
.010 (.084)
.150 (.039)***
.019 (.006***
.110 (.097

Approval
Subjective
-.258
.202
.083
-.001
-.075

(.1 04)**
(.099)*
(.1 01)
(.052)
(.056)

.160 (.046)***

Agent Creation
Self-Selection
.11 0
.532
.470
.360
.161

(. 137)
(.1 57)***
(.1 53)**
(.079)***
(.074)*

Training
Objective
-.013
.486
.119
.070
.045

(.186)
(.1 91)*
(.192)
(.116)
(.112)

.051 (.069)

.094 (.089)

.105 (.082)
.192 (.133)

-.067 (.1 06)
-.006 (.167)

.289 (.072)* **
.031 (.007)* * ~
.891 (.114)***

.077 (. 128)
.005 (.011 )
-.018 (. 145)

-.024 (.127)
.015 (.012)

.039 (.040)

-.047 (.053)

.047 (.071)

.021 (.056)
-.023 (.092)

-.976 (.107)***

.631 (. 186)***

-.491 (.168)* *

.004 (.051)
-1 .099 (.519)*
-.192 (.067)**
-.111 (.088)
.399 (.510)

-.044 (.496)

1.1 56 (.072)***

.345 (.267)

-.099 (.665)

.352 (.795)

Sample Size
9008
7236
5632
4848
2936
1788
Rho(chi2)
-.948 (9.100)* *
-.867 (8. 140)**
-.467 (2.490) -. 177 (. 170)
.169 (.190)
Log Likelihood
-4342.649
-8083.300
-8019.486
-9102.341
-7315.992
-5192.880
1 The model for the first step is simple probit. The selection models for the subsequent steps are omitted and available from the authors upon request.

Table 4. The Probability of a Job Candidate Completing a Step of the Rec1·uitment Process:
Bivariate Probit Model with the Agent- Referrer as a Predictor, Controlling for Selection at the Previous Stepst
Steps of the Recruitment Process
Voice Test
Approval

Tests Taking
Tests Passing
Agent Creation
Hiring Channel (Internet)
Agent
.509 (.042)***
-.027 (.042)
.246 (.052)***
-.052 (.076)
.250 (.104)*
Friend
.247 (.039)* **
-.171 (.040)** *
.131 (.049)**
-.003 (.051)
.187 (.07 4)*
Other
.124 (.045)**
-.111 (.047)**
.109 (.057)
-.076 (.055)
.098 (.060)
Sample Size
9008
7236
5632
4848
2936
f Only the coefficient estimates for the hiring channels are shown. The other coefficients are identical to their counterparts in Table 3.

Training

.1 03 (. 146)
-.066 (.095)
-.012 (. 101 )
1788

Fig. 2. The Effect of the Referrer's Performance on
the likelihood of Passing Tests

Fig.1. The Effect ofthe Referrer's Performance on
the likelihood of Taking Tests
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Fig. 4. The Effect of Referrer's Perfonnance on the
likelihood of Being Approved
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Fig. 3. The Effect of Referrer's Performance on the
likelihood of Taking the Voice Test
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Fig. 5. The Effect of Referrer's Performance on the
Likelihood of Becorring an Agent
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Fig. 6. The Effect of Referrer's Performance on the
Likelihood of Passing the Training Stage
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Appendix A
The Dictionary of the Independent and Control Variables

Definition

Variables
Hiring Channel
Rated Agent
Unrated Agent
Performance of Rated Agent
Friend
Internet

=
=
=
=
=

Education
Secondary
Higher
Advanced

1 if the referrer is a current agent with performance record
1 if the referrer is a current agent without a perform. record
mean relativ e utilization rate of the agent across pay periods
1 if the referrer is a non-agent friend
1 if the referrer is an Internet based channel
(chat room, bulletin board, job ad)

1 if the applicant graduated from a secondary school
1 if the applicant has a university degree
1 if the applicant has an advanced degree

Call Center Experience
Sales Experience
Previous Job Experience
Telemarketing Experience
Excellent Spanish

= 1 if the applicant has call center experience
Number of years of experience in sales
Number of previous jobs held by the applicant
= 1 if the applicant has telemarketing experience
= 1 if the applicant speaks and writes perfectly in Spanish

Agents from the Same State

=

Asian
Black
Hispanic
Log(Income)

Percent of Asian population in the in the applicant' s zip code
Percent of Black population in the in the applicant' s zip code
Percent of Hispanic population in the in the applicant' s zip code
Logg ed of income in the applicant's zip code

Number of agents in the V CC sy stem, from the same state
with the applicant

